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GuidePublished 16 Aug 202615 min readBy KEVOS Editorialr&d portfolio managementportfolio gridproductivity curveexpected return
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KEVOS AIR&D Portfolio Displays and Strategy Tables

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R&D Portfolio Displays and Strategy Tables

A grid, a curve, a segment table and a probabilistic forecast, each catching something the other three are blind to — plus the upstream device that decides what ends up on them. Portfolio level throughout; the per-project mechanics live elsewhere.

Reading time17 minutes
LevelCore
Topic streamRd Project Management
Source materialR&D Management Papers
Updated2026-08-16

In brief

  • R&D management is described as three roles — strategic, operational and people. The first two are coupled by project evaluation and project decisions, which is where portfolio displays do their work.
  • Four displays answer four different portfolio questions: balance, efficiency, where the return sits, and whether the pipeline will deliver.
  • The productivity curve is the one that changes behaviour. Ranking projects by expected value divided by expected cost exposes a tail of work returning less than it consumes.
  • Report expected revenue, not potential revenue. Potential revenue assumes every project succeeds and is commercialised, which the source calls clearly unrealistic.
  • A strategy table sits upstream of all four. A portfolio choice is only as good as the alternatives on offer, and the table is what generates them.

Three management roles, coupled by project decisions

R9 opens by splitting R&D management into three roles and claiming that all three must be performed at high quality for an organisation to reach its potential. The split matters because portfolio displays are instruments of one specific role, and are routinely misapplied to another.

THE THREE ROLES OF R&D MANAGEMENT

RoleDefinition givenShorthand
Strategic managementAllocating resourcesDoing the right R&D
Operational managementExecution of projectsDoing the R&D right
People managementLeadership, organisation, motivation, teamworkDescribed in the source as possibly the most important of the three

Close paraphrase of the source's own definitions.

Strategic and operational management are coupled by project evaluation and project decisions. The highest-level project decisions are go/no-go — selection, continuation, modification and termination — and project strategy decisions, meaning the definition of the project and its goals, are part of the same coupling.

That is the argument for portfolio displays in one sentence. If the two halves of R&D management meet at project decisions, then the instruments that inform those decisions are what connect resource allocation to what actually happens in a laboratory.

Note

A figure the source quotes, not one it produces

R9 reports that 9 of the 12 most important actions R&D organisations can take to improve productivity involve strategic management of R&D. That comes from a study by an industrial research association, cited to a 1984 reference.

It is an externally cited figure. R9 is not itself evidence for it, the underlying study is from the mid-1980s, and the twelve actions themselves are not reproduced. Quote it as a 1984 study reported that, not as a finding of the article you are reading.

The four displays and the question each answers

DISPLAY 1

Portfolio grid

Are we balanced? Probability of success against potential commercial value, one bubble per project, four named quadrants.

DISPLAY 2

Productivity curve

Are we efficient? Expected return per project against cumulative cost to completion, highest return first.

DISPLAY 3

Segment return analysis

Where does the return actually sit? Return, success rate and budget share by business and technology category.

DISPLAY 4

Probabilistic revenue forecast

Will the pipeline deliver? Potential revenue against probability-weighted expected revenue, over the product life cycle.

The strategy table, upstream of every display

A portfolio decision is a choice among alternatives, and its quality is bounded by the alternatives available to choose between. A grid of twenty projects that were each defined by one team, unchallenged, is a precise picture of an unexamined set of options.

The strategy table is the source's answer to that. Every major product design decision becomes a column, a wide range of options is listed beneath each, and alternative product concepts are traced as paths across the columns. The construction mechanics belong with the other project-level tools and are set out in R&D project evaluation tools. What matters at portfolio level is what it produces: several coherent, genuinely different candidate definitions of the same project, before anything is funded.

The printed example is a strategy table for a medical diagnostic system, with columns for test menu, time to answer, ease of use, pricing, quality control and educating customers. Those columns are one illustrative case from 1994, not a template — the point they demonstrate is that six independent design decisions produce a very large space of possible products, and that a team which has never laid them out has not chosen among them.

From the source

Shared vision as a funding gate

The table's second use is described in the source as even more important than generating options: mapping alternative concepts as paths across the columns reveals differences of opinion. The worked instance is a substantial divergence between an R&D manager's vision of a product and a marketing manager's vision of the same product.

The rule the source draws from it is a gate, not advice: senior management should require the team to present an explicit, accepted and shared vision of the product before funding a major new-product development project. Failure to build that shared vision from the start is named one of the most common and most destructive failure modes, causing enormous rework across many industries.

In decision-quality terms this is the alternatives dimension being enforced at the point of funding — see Decision quality in R&D for the full set of six.

Display 1 — the portfolio grid

The grid plots probability of success on the vertical axis against potential commercial value on the horizontal, with each project a bubble. Its four quadrants carry names that have long outlived the article.

THE FOUR QUADRANTS

QuadrantPositionWhat it is telling you
PearlsHigh probability, high valueThe projects everyone agrees about. Their scarcity is the interesting number
Bread and butterHigh probability, low valueReliable, modest, and capable of filling a portfolio without advancing it
OystersLow probability, high valueWhere the upside is. Also where an underfunded portfolio quietly stops competing
White elephantsLow probability, low valueWork that survives on momentum. The quadrant to explain rather than defend

Quadrant names and axes are from the source. The right-hand column is our reading of what each position implies.

The stated purpose is balancing R&D effort across trade-offs such as risk against return, and the source's balance rule is directional rather than numerical: a portfolio should have few projects of low potential value and many of high potential value, and if the reverse is true management must investigate why. The portfolio in the printed figure is diagnosed as imbalanced — an illustrative client display, not a benchmark distribution.

Caution

The grid rewards its author and penalises the successor

Because low-probability projects are usually several years from commercialisation, a head of R&D running a portfolio loaded with high-probability projects will appear to be successful for the next several years — but, in the source's words, the successor may be in for trouble.

So current R&D performance is a lagging and misleading signal of portfolio health. The grid is one of the few instruments that shows the problem while it is still fixable, which is why the source names monitoring and improving portfolio balance as one of R&D management's prime responsibilities rather than an annual exercise.

Display 2 — the productivity curve

The productivity curve is the display most likely to change what an organisation funds. Each project's expected return — expected value divided by expected cost — is plotted against cumulative R&D cost to completion, with projects ordered from the highest return downwards. The result is a descending curve whose horizontal axis is the whole budget.

Building it

  1. Compute expected return for every project

    Potential commercial value multiplied by probability of success, divided by R&D cost to completion. The source calls this the productivity index: how efficiently a project uses R&D resources to create value.

  2. Rank from highest to lowest

    The ordering is the display. Nothing is grouped by business unit, sponsor or age.

  3. Plot against cumulative cost

    Each project occupies horizontal width equal to its remaining cost, so the axis accumulates to the total portfolio cost to completion.

  4. Read the tail

    Find where the curve crosses an expected return of one. Everything to the right of that point is expected to consume more than it returns.

Source example — illustrative only

The illustrative curve, and what is a rule rather than a measurement

In the printed example, projects in the 5 million to 20 million dollar cumulative-cost band are described as typical of that organisation in that industry — covering their costs and generating a modest excess return — and the last 25 per cent of cumulative cost in that laboratory is allocated to projects whose expected return is less than one. Both figures describe one anonymised client display from 1994. Neither is a norm, a benchmark or an expected proportion for anyone else.

Two further claims in the source are general rules drawn from the authors' experience rather than measurements: that actual R&D projects in most organisations cover a range of expected return of at least an order of magnitude, and that the curve "nearly always" shows the same characteristic shape. Treat both as hypotheses to test against your own portfolio.

The operational rule attached to the curve is deliberately not automatic. If a project's expected return is less than one, management must ask why — many such projects can and should be improved, and only some should be terminated. The curve identifies candidates for a conversation, not a cut list.

Display 3 — segment return analysis

The third display aggregates projects into categories — the whole portfolio, business areas, technology types — and reports potential return, expected return and success rate for each. The source describes it as a dollar-on-dollar return comparison across businesses and technologies.

THE PRINTED SEGMENT ANALYSIS — ILLUSTRATIVE CLIENT DATA, 1994

SegmentReturn if successfulRate of successExpected returnShare of R&D budget
Whole R&D portfolio8 to 150%4 to 1100%
Core business4 to 175%3 to 145%
New business4 to 125%1 to 130%
New technology for existing markets6 to 135%2 to 1not legible in the source extract
Existing technology for new markets24 to 150%12 to 15%

One organisation's illustrative figures, reproduced to show the display's structure. They are not typical values and no organisation should compare itself against them. Return if successful multiplied by rate of success reproduces expected return in every row, so those three columns are internally consistent.

Source gap

One cell could not be read

The budget share for new technology for existing markets is not legible in the extract this library was built from. The four readable shares sum to 80 per cent, so a complete row summing to 100 would imply 20 per cent — but that is arithmetic, not a printed value, and it is recorded here as an inference rather than data.

If you need the exact figure, it requires the original page. This is a good illustration of a general handling rule: when a source value is unreadable, publish the gap rather than the inference.

Two blocks are flagged in the printed display, and they show what the analysis is for. New business takes 30 per cent of the budget for a 1-to-1 expected return, and is marked for re-examination. Existing technology for new markets returns 12 to 1 on 5 per cent of the budget, and is marked for expansion. Neither conclusion is available from a project-by-project view; both fall out of the segmentation immediately.

One caution on the success-rate column. Rates of success in a display like this are internal estimates for one organisation's own categories, not published industry rates — and how new-product success is defined and measured is itself contested, as Measuring new product success rates sets out.

Display 4 — the probabilistic revenue forecast

The fourth display combines time to completion and probability of success with peak sales revenue and product life-cycle information, producing two curves over the same horizon. Potential revenue assumes every project succeeds technically and is commercialised. Expected revenue is probability-weighted.

From the source

Report the lower curve

The source's instruction is unambiguous: report expected revenue, not potential revenue, as the forecast. Potential revenue assumes all projects will be technically successful and commercialised, which it calls clearly unrealistic.

And the observation attached to it: well-managed R&D organisations present potential revenue as their forecast, "only to lose significant credibility a few years later". The failure is not optimism in the estimates — it is publishing the wrong curve.

The printed forecast runs from 1991 to 2009, an illustrative horizon from a 1994 article that happens to show the display's real purpose: an eighteen-year view lets business managers see whether the pipeline will meet business goals, and lets deviations from long-term goals be spotted early enough to correct.

If the pipeline will not deliver what is needed

IfThe expected revenue curve falls short of the business plan
ThenThe source names five responses to explore: increase R&D funding; increase R&D productivity; acquire new technology; acquire existing products or businesses; or improve the productivity of existing businesses.
IfThe gap is small and several years out
ThenProductivity is the lever the other three displays inform. The productivity curve and the segment analysis both point at where return is being lost.
IfThe gap is large and near-term
ThenR&D cannot close it. Acquisition of products or businesses is on the source's own list precisely because a pipeline has a minimum lead time.

Reading the four displays together

Each display answers a different question, and each is capable of looking healthy while another looks alarming. Used together they cross-examine one another.

WHAT EACH DISPLAY CATCHES THAT THE OTHERS MISS

DisplayCatchesBlind to
Portfolio gridImbalance — too little high-value or high-risk workCost. A pearl and a white elephant occupy equal space regardless of what they consume
Productivity curveInefficiency — the tail returning less than it costsStrategic fit. A high-return project can still be in the wrong business
Segment return analysisMisallocation between businesses and technology typesIndividual projects. A strong segment can contain weak work
Revenue forecastA pipeline that will not meet the plan, early enough to actWhy. It shows the shortfall without diagnosing its cause

The productivity curve carries one further instruction worth stating plainly, because it contradicts the most common response to a budget reduction. When budgets get tight, do not cut all projects uniformly; completely eliminate some of the weakest projects if they cannot be dramatically improved. The source's explanation for why uniform cutting persists is not cowardice but evidence: management rarely has credible assessments on which to base termination decisions. Building those assessments is the governance problem treated in Governing R&D decisions organisationally.

Check before you proceed

Before you present a portfolio display

  • Is every project's expected value conditional on success, with probability applied separately and visibly?
  • Is cost to completion current, rather than the original budget or the amount already spent?
  • Are the categories in the segment analysis ones the business recognises, or ones invented for the chart?
  • Have you labelled which curve is expected and which is potential, on the forecast?
  • Can you say, for each illustrative figure you have borrowed from anywhere, whether it is your organisation's data or someone else's example?

What to carry forward

  1. Strategic and operational R&D management meet at project decisions. Portfolio displays are the instruments of that joint, and belong to the strategic role.
  2. Generate alternatives before you display a portfolio. A grid of unchallenged project definitions is a precise picture of an unexamined choice.
  3. Rank by expected value divided by expected cost. The tail below an expected return of one is the finding, and it warrants a conversation rather than an automatic cut.
  4. Segment the portfolio. Misallocation between business and technology categories is invisible project by project and obvious in one table.
  5. Publish expected revenue, not potential revenue. The credibility cost of the optimistic curve arrives a few years later, reliably.
  6. Every number in the printed displays is one organisation's illustrative data from 1994. The structures transfer; the values do not.

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between the portfolio grid and the productivity curve?

The grid shows balance — how projects are distributed across probability of success and potential value — and treats each project as a point regardless of cost. The curve shows efficiency, ranking projects by expected value divided by expected cost and laying them out across the whole budget. A portfolio can look balanced on the grid while a quarter of its cost sits below an expected return of one.

Should we terminate everything with an expected return below one?

The source does not say so. Its rule is that where expected return is less than one, management must ask why — many such projects can and should be improved, and only some should be terminated. The curve is a way of finding the conversations that need to happen, not a decision rule.

Can I use the segment return figures from the source as benchmarks?

No. They are illustrative data from one anonymised organisation in 1994, reproduced to show the display's structure. The internal arithmetic is consistent, which makes the table useful as a worked example, but the values carry no information about any other organisation.

Why does the source object to potential revenue forecasts?

Because potential revenue assumes every project will succeed technically and be commercialised, which it calls clearly unrealistic. Its observation is that well-managed organisations present that curve and lose significant credibility a few years later, when the pipeline delivers the probability-weighted result instead.

How does a strategy table relate to portfolio management?

It sits upstream. Portfolio choice is a choice among alternatives, so the quality of any display is bounded by the quality of the project definitions on it. The strategy table generates several coherent alternative concepts for the same project and exposes disagreement between functions before funding, which is why the source treats a shared product vision as a funding gate.

Do these displays require special software?

They were drawn for a 1994 article and none of them needs anything a spreadsheet cannot do. What they need is the underlying per-project estimates — cost to completion, probability of success and potential commercial value — which is the expensive part and the part the source spends most of its length on.

References and source attribution

  1. R9 - improving R&D decisions and execution. Practitioner methods article in a journal for R&D and technology managers, 1994; 8 printed pages; a synthesis of a decision-analysis toolkit illustrated with anonymised client displays, containing nine figures. Not empirical research.
  2. Eleven copyrighted journal articles on R&D project management, supplied as a reading set for a literature review and profiled for this library. Front matter, abstracts, framework sections, tables and figures were read; article bodies were not reproduced, and all content here is paraphrase.
  3. Figures reproduced in outline from R9: a strategy table for a medical diagnostic system; an R&D portfolio grid; an R&D productivity curve; a portfolio segment return analysis; and a probabilistic new-product revenue forecast. All values are illustrative client data, and one cell of the segment analysis was not legible in the extract used.
  4. Externally cited within R9 and not independently verified: a study by an industrial research association, cited to a 1984 reference, reporting that 9 of the 12 most important actions R&D organisations can take to improve productivity involve strategic management of R&D.
  5. Supplied teaching source for this library (research methods and research process materials). Used here for page conventions and voice only; it does not treat R&D project management.

Suggested questions for Ask KEVOS

  • Turn my project list into a portfolio grid and tell me which quadrant is over-weighted.
  • Calculate expected return for my projects and show me where the curve crosses one.
  • How should I segment my R&D portfolio for a return comparison across businesses?
  • Draft the expected-revenue version of a pipeline forecast I currently present as potential revenue.
  • What alternatives should a strategy table generate for a product I describe?
  • How do I explain to a board why we should cut some projects entirely instead of trimming all of them?

Related KEVOS knowledge

R&D Project Evaluation ToolsCore · rd project managementDecision Quality in R&D: Six DimensionsCore · rd project managementGoverning R&D Decisions OrganisationallyAdvanced · rd project managementFinancial Techniques for R&D Project SelectionCore · rd project managementMeasuring New Product Success RatesCore · rd project managementSelecting R&D Projects: An Informational ViewAdvanced · rd project management
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