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GuidePublished 16 Aug 202616 min readBy KEVOS Editorialreal options r&doption value of research and developmentabandonment option valuationnpv undervalues r&d
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Project DeliveryResearch ProjectsAdvancedRd Project Management

Real Options Valuation of R&D Projects

R&D buys the right to implement, not the obligation, and discounted cash flow prices that asymmetry at zero. A 2000 practitioner source builds the valuation instead from two distributions most firms already forecast — and both of its worked examples are reproduced here with their numbers.

Reading time18 minutes
LevelAdvanced
Topic streamRd Project Management
Source materialR&D Management Papers
Updated2026-08-16

In brief

  • R2 argues an R&D project is structurally a call option: management keeps the right, not the obligation, to implement the results, so the downside is capped at the R&D spend.
  • The analogy breaks in one place. A stock option has one uncertainty, the future stock price. An R&D project has two: expected revenues and expected implementation costs.
  • That break is the argument. The classical model takes the exercise price as a point estimate, so it cannot represent uncertain implementation cost — and three further assumptions fail too.
  • The proposed model computes option value directly from separate distributions of implementation revenues and costs: the two forecasts firms already build for a net present value calculation.
  • Two worked examples are given. Both are illustrations, not findings, and one deliberately borrows the rival model's assumptions so the comparison is like-for-like.

The call-option analogy, and the one place it breaks

R2 is a practitioner methods article from 2000. It proposes a valuation model, derives a closed-form result and demonstrates it on two examples; it reports no empirical study. Its opening move is a structural comparison, not a metaphor.

R2'S STRUCTURAL COMPARISON — STOCK OPTION AGAINST R&D PROJECT

Stock optionR&D project
What the owner getsThe right, not the obligation, to buy stock at a stated price — the striking priceThe right, not the obligation, to implement the R&D results at some future time
First decisionWhether to buy the option, on estimates of uncertain future benefitsWhether to invest in the R&D project — the same logic
Second decision, at expiryExercise, or let the option lapseAt R&D completion: implement by investing in production and marketing, or terminate if results are not promising
DownsideLimited to the option premiumLimited to the amount invested in the R&D phase
Number of uncertaintiesOne — the future stock price. The striking price is known in advanceTwo — expected revenues and expected production and marketing costs

Close paraphrase of R2's own comparison. The last row is the row the rest of the paper is built on.

From the source

The pivotal point

Because the R&D manager faces two uncertainties rather than one, two models of uncertainty are required — one for expected revenues and one for expected costs.

That is what the classical closed-form option-pricing model cannot accommodate, because it treats the exercise price as a known point estimate. Everything else in R2 follows from the mismatch.

The consequence R2 draws is directional, not incidental. Traditional net present value analysis ignores the flexibility, systematically undervalues R&D, and causes valuable projects to be rejected on negative NPV — a claim about method bias, not estimator error. For the discounted-cash-flow toolkit it argues against, see financial techniques for R&D project selection, and for the frame that toolkit sits in, the financial frame for R&D management.

Four objections to the classical closed-form model

R2 does not reject the classical model as wrong in its own domain. It states four reasons the model's required inputs are ones R&D cannot supply.

The four stated objections

OBJECTION 1

The distributional assumption

The model assumes the future value of the underlying — for R&D, the cash flows received if the results are implemented — is lognormally distributed and cannot be negative. R2 says this may not hold for every R&D project.

OBJECTION 2

The value of the underlying asset

If the underlying asset is not traded in the market, as with R&D projects, it is difficult if not impossible to establish its value. This is the parameter-determination problem the real-options literature raises.

OBJECTION 3

Volatility

Volatility derives from the price relative — final stock price divided by initial stock price — obtained from historical data, which does not usually exist for R&D projects.

OBJECTION 4

A point-estimate exercise price

The model uses a point estimate for the exercise price, so it cannot recognise uncertainty in production and marketing costs. This is the structural break above, restated as a parameter failure.

R2 also objects to the alternative already in circulation. A decision-analysis approach removes some of the possibly unrealistic assumptions, but it still requires management to estimate the distribution of net cash flows. R2's premise is that management is more likely to hold two separate estimates — production and marketing costs, and anticipated revenues — than a single net-cash-flow distribution.

The model — inputs, equations and outputs

Notation, as R2 sets it out

V*
Value of the R&D project at completion of the R&D phase.
R
Net present value of the anticipated revenues — the analogue of the terminal underlying price.
K
Net present value of production and marketing costs — the analogue of the exercise price.
X
Net cash flows, defined as R − K.
f_X(x)
Probability density function of the net cash flows X.
k, t
Discount rate, and time to completion of the R&D phase.

The verbal rule comes first. At the implementation decision, the value of the R&D project is the difference between the NPV of anticipated revenues and the NPV of production and marketing costs. If revenues exceed costs the project has a positive value; otherwise it has none — and because the firm need not make the additional investment when costs exceed revenues, it never realises a loss from that decision.

  1. Equation 1, value at completion: V* = max[0, R − K]
  2. Equation 2, the same rule as a conditional: V* = R − K if R > K, and V* = 0 if R < K
  3. Equation 3, expected value at completion: E[V*] = ∫₀^∞ x · f_X(x) dx
  4. Equation 4, what the firm would pay for the R&D at the start: V = e^(−kt) · ∫₀^∞ x · f_X(x) dx
From the source

The lower limit of zero is where the option lives

Equation 3 integrates from zero, not from minus infinity. Only the positive part of the net-cash-flow distribution enters the valuation, because the negative part is where the firm walks away.

R2 illustrates this with a density curve whose negative region is shaded off. The abandonment option erases the left half of the distribution from the valuation, which is why the asymmetry rather than the mean is where the extra value comes from. That walk-away is a real decision someone has to make and defend; see making better project termination decisions.

Equation 5 is the closed form for the case R2 argues is the realistic one. Let R and K be independent, normally distributed random variables with means μ_r and μ_k and variances σ_r² and σ_k². Then X = R − K is normally distributed, with mean μ_x = μ_r − μ_k and variance σ_x² = σ_r² + σ_k².

The expected value of the R&D project at completion is then E[V*] = (σ_x / √(2π)) · e^(−μ_x² / (2σ_x²)) + (μ_r − μ_k) · P(X > 0). Discounting that back over the R&D phase by equation 4 gives what the firm would be willing to pay for the R&D at the beginning.

Caution

Variances add, so cost uncertainty increases the option value

Because R and K are assumed independent, σ_x² = σ_r² + σ_k². Uncertainty in implementation cost therefore raises the computed option value, where conventional practice treats cost uncertainty as a reason to discount a project harder.

Read the closed form as two additive pieces: a volatility term, strictly positive and increasing in σ_x, plus the conventional expected-NPV term scaled by the probability of finishing in the money. A project with μ_r − μ_k ≤ 0 still carries positive value from the first term alone — the formal statement of why a negative-NPV project can be worth doing.

Source gap

What could not be read cleanly, and one figure that must not be attributed

This library worked from an extract of the printed article. Three things need flagging before anyone quotes it:

  • The leading coefficient of equation 5 is partially corrupted. The printed structure — an exponential term plus (μ_r − μ_k)·P(X > 0) — is the standard mean of a normal variate truncated below at zero, and the second example is consistent with it, but the coefficient is not fully legible.
  • Example 2's two closing numbers fall in a corrupted column break. A value can be recomputed from the paper's own inputs, but any such figure is a reconstruction rather than the paper's result, and is not published here.
  • A widely repeated ratio of raw ideas to commercial successes appears in the back-matter advertising copy of the same issue. It is not a claim of R2 and must not be attributed to it.

The conditions under which the normal version holds

Gates R2 states before you use equation 5

  • Costs and revenues can be modelled as normal only if the distribution lies far enough right of zero that the probability of negative values is approximately zero.
  • R and K must exceed zero; the net quantity X may be positive or negative, which is why a lognormal assumption on the net quantity is inappropriate.
  • R and K are assumed independent. Correlated cost and revenue shocks are not handled.
  • Average sales must be expected to exceed average production and marketing costs — otherwise, as R2 puts it, the firm will eventually go out of business.
  • If the data for the two distributions are approximately normal, the model may be used. If not, fall back on the general integral in equations 3 and 4 with whatever density applies.
  • A real, exercisable abandonment option must exist at R&D completion.

R2 also states where the two distributions come from. Depending on the project, the technology and market conditions, the cost distribution could be estimated from data for similar projects or products, and the revenue distribution from sales figures for related products and from market research. That is a historical-baseline method, carrying the same weakness it has elsewhere in R&D financial analysis — it works least well where the technology is most novel.

The model-selection logic

Which valuation to run, following R2's stated sequence

IfThere is no genuine abandonment option at R&D completion
ThenThe option frame does not apply. Value the commitment conventionally.
IfThere is a real option to abandon
ThenNPV alone understates the project. Do not stop at a negative NPV.
IfYou cannot observe a traded underlying or a historical price-relative volatility
ThenThe classical closed-form model is unusable in practice.
IfYou hold a distribution for net cash flows
ThenThe earlier decision-analysis approach works. R2 does not dispute this.
IfYou hold two separate estimates — costs and revenues
ThenUse R2's model: equations 3 and 4.
IfBoth are approximately normal and far enough right of zero
ThenUse equation 5. Otherwise use the general integral with the applicable density.

Worked example 1 — a like-for-like comparison

R2 states this example is adapted from a real-options textbook and based on a project at a large pharmaceutical company. Treat every figure as a worked illustration built on figures reported for one case — not a finding of R2, and not a benchmark.

WORKED EXAMPLE 1 — ILLUSTRATIVE FIGURES, NOT BENCHMARKS

QuantityValue as printedProvenance
Duration of the R&D phaseFour yearsIllustrative
Cost to implement the results, in year 4$1.5 billionIllustrative, reported case figure
Discounted cash value of expected revenues$1,332 billion as printed — the arithmetic that follows implies $1,332 millionIllustrative; printed inconsistency flagged, not corrected
Discount rate k20 percentIllustrative
Current value of the project, S = 1332·e^(−kt)598.5Illustrative, derived in text
Cost to implement, K1500Illustrative
Time to expiration, t4Illustrative
Risk-free discount rate, r.10Illustrative
Relative volatility, σ.35Illustrative, given rather than estimated
Option value from the classical formula$70 millionIllustrative, computed for comparison
Expected value of R, assumed lognormal, for R2's model$767 millionIllustrative
Result of applying equation 3 to that lognormal density208Illustrative, computed
Option value from R2's model after discounting$93.5 millionIllustrative, computed

R2's stated conclusion is that its own model returns a value slightly higher than the classical formula's on the same case.

Source example — illustrative only

Read this example for what it is

In Example 1 the author deliberately adopts the classical model's own assumptions — lognormal revenues, a known point-estimate implementation cost — though the proposed model requires neither. Example 1 is therefore not a demonstration of the model's distinctive capability, and $93.5 million against $70 million is not a claim of general superiority.

One detail before you rebuild the arithmetic: the paper does not say which rate it uses in the final discounting step. A check performed for this library — not a statement in the paper — shows that discounting 208 at 20 percent over four years reproduces 93.5, so that step uses k.

Worked example 2 — the case the classical model cannot take

R2 states this second example is the one used by the earlier decision-analysis authors, although the results are slightly different. Illustrative figures only.

WORKED EXAMPLE 2 — THE NORMAL-DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION

QuantityValue as printedProvenance
Time to project completionThree years from nowIllustrative
Revenues: mean μ_r$10MIllustrative
Revenues: standard deviation σ_r$1.732MIllustrative
Production and marketing costs: mean μ_k$9MIllustrative
Production and marketing costs: standard deviation σ_k$1MIllustrative
Net cash flows: mean μ_x$1MIllustrative, derived as μ_r − μ_k
Net cash flows: standard deviation σ_x$2MIllustrative, derived as √(1.732² + 1²)
P(X > 0)0.69Illustrative, derived
E[V*] at completion, and willingness to pay at the startNot recoverable from the extractLost in a column break — see the gap note above

The derived standard deviation shows the variance-addition rule working: two modest spreads combine into a $2M spread on a $1M mean.

The payoff of Example 2 is its closing statement rather than its arithmetic: the classical model could not be used here, because the revenues are not lognormally distributed. That is the demonstration Example 1 could not provide.

What follows, and what the model does not settle

  • Implement if and only if R > K at R&D completion. If R < K, terminate; the value is zero and no loss is realised beyond the R&D investment.
  • Value the R&D itself with equation 4 and compare it to the cost of the R&D phase. That comparison, not the raw NPV, is the buy decision.
  • Do not use a point estimate for implementation cost when that cost is genuinely uncertain. Model it as a distribution.
  • Given equal average returns, prefer the project with the larger variance — a much larger payoff is possible at no additional cost, because the loss is capped at the R&D investment.
  • Do not reject an R&D project solely on negative NPV.
Caution

Stated limits worth carrying with the model

R2 reduces the estimation burden; it does not remove it. Management must still produce two distributions — the burden simply moves to two quantities managers plausibly already forecast.

Independence of revenues and costs is assumed. Normality is not claimed to be universally right, only more reasonable than lognormal for R&D outcomes. R2 also notes that the earlier decision-analysis work never examined the distributions that would produce normally distributed net benefits — so the normality of net benefits in that approach was itself unjustified.

Note

This is not the real-options paper covered in the research-design pages

The library already discusses a real-options paper, in five journal article research designs. They are different works read for different purposes, so the overlap is worth naming precisely.

That page profiles a 2008 mathematical-modelling paper proposing a real-options method that incorporates a firm's hedging behaviour, so a valuation is not swayed by evaluators' subjective expectations of future market or technological prospects. It is read there as a design: an example of a publishable contribution that collects no data at all.

R2 on this page is a 2000 practitioner article, proposing a different model for a different defect — not evaluator subjectivity but the classical model's inability to represent uncertain implementation cost. It is read here for its substance: equations, conditions, examples. Same family of technique, different papers, eight years apart.

What to carry forward

  1. The option analogy is structural and breaks in one place: R&D has two uncertainties, revenues and implementation costs, where a stock option has one.
  2. The four objections to the classical model are objections about available inputs — untraded underlying, no historical volatility, a lognormal assumption that may not hold, a point-estimate exercise price.
  3. The proposed model needs only what a forecasting cycle already produces. Its output is the amount the firm should be willing to pay for the R&D phase.
  4. Cost uncertainty raises the computed value, because variances add. Say so explicitly when you present a number, or it will look like an error.
  5. Both examples are illustrations. The first borrows the rival model's assumptions on purpose; two figures in the second are not recoverable from the extract.

Frequently asked questions

Does this replace net present value for R&D?

No. It changes what you do with a negative NPV. R2's position is that conventional NPV ignores the right to walk away at R&D completion, and so systematically undervalues R&D projects. The model uses the same cost and revenue projections a firm already builds for NPV, but integrates only the positive part of the resulting net-cash-flow distribution.

Why can't I just use the standard closed-form option-pricing formula?

R2 gives four reasons. The underlying asset is not traded, so its value cannot be established. Volatility in that model comes from historical price relatives that do not exist for R&D. The lognormal assumption on the underlying may not hold. And the formula takes the exercise price as a point estimate, so it cannot represent uncertainty in production and marketing costs.

Why does more cost uncertainty make the project look more valuable?

Because revenues and costs are assumed independent, their variances add, so uncertainty in either raises the spread of net cash flows. A wider spread raises the volatility term in the closed form, and the downside is capped by the option to abandon. It is a genuine consequence of the model, not an artefact, but expect to have to explain it — it inverts the usual capital-budgeting instinct.

How do I estimate the two distributions?

R2 states the sources: production and marketing costs from data for similar projects or products, and revenues from sales figures for related products and from market research. Whether normality then holds is an empirical check on your own data, and the model's gate is that both distributions sit far enough to the right of zero that the probability of negative values is approximately zero.

Are the numbers in the two examples usable as benchmarks?

No. Both are illustrative worked examples. The first is adapted from a textbook case and deliberately adopts the classical model's assumptions so the two methods can be compared like for like, so the $93.5 million against $70 million result is a controlled comparison rather than evidence of general superiority.

What if implementation is already committed?

Then the model does not apply. The whole approach presupposes a real, exercisable abandonment option at R&D completion. If the organisation is contractually or strategically bound to implement whatever the R&D produces, there is no option to value and the downside is not capped.

References and source attribution

  1. R2 - capturing the option value of R&D. Practitioner methods article in a journal for research and technology management, July-August 2000; 4 printed pages. Proposes a valuation model, derives a closed-form result for the normal case, and demonstrates it on two worked examples. Not an empirical study; 12 references; two figures.
  2. The real-options textbook case and the earlier decision-analysis treatment that R2 compares itself against are cited within R2 and were not supplied to this library. They are recorded as R2 describes them and are not summarised independently.
  3. Eleven copyrighted journal articles on R&D project management, supplied as a reading set for a literature review and profiled for this library. Front matter, abstracts, framework sections, tables and figures were read; article bodies were not reproduced, and all content here is paraphrase. The set is a reading list, not a systematic survey of the field.
  4. Supplied teaching source for this library (research methods and research process materials). Used here for page conventions and voice only; it does not treat R&D valuation.

Suggested questions for Ask KEVOS

  • Walk me through equation 5 using my own revenue and cost estimates.
  • My project has a negative NPV. Show me how the option frame would change the case I put to the board.
  • How do I test whether my cost and revenue forecasts are close enough to normal to use the closed form?
  • Draft the explanation I will need when someone asks why more cost uncertainty raised the valuation.
  • What would I have to be able to observe before the classical option-pricing model became usable here?
  • Compare this model with the decision-analysis approach it positions itself against.

Related KEVOS knowledge

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